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A few clinical reports and empirical studies have suggested a possible deficit in the perception of speech in individuals with
Parkinson’s disease. In this paper, these studies are reviewed in an attempt to support clinical anecdotal observations by relevant
empirical research findings. The combined evidence suggests a possible deficit in patients’ perception of their own speech loudness.
Other research studies on the perception of speech in this population were reviewed, in a broader scope of the perception of
emotional prosody. These studies confirm that Parkinson’s disease specifically impairs patients’ perception of verbal emotions.
However, explanations of the nature and causes of this perceptual deficit are still limited. Future research directions are suggested.
1. Introduction
Parkinson’s disease is generally believed to be caused by
a loss of dopaminergic cells in the substantia nigra pars
compacta of the basal ganglia [1] Reduction of dopamine
limits the ability of the basal ganglia to coordinate inhibitory
and excitatory neural motor signals in cortical-subcortical
circuits. The motor consequences of such malfunction are
rigidity, tremor, and dyskinesia.
Speech production is also affected by Parkinson’s disease,
resulting in hypokinetic dysarthria, which is characterized
by monoloudness, monotone, and unclear articulation [2–
6]. Approximately 70%–75% of individuals with Parkinson’s
disease exhibit speech disorder at some stage of the disease [7,
8]. However, the motor speech disorder does not necessarily
correlate with the disease severity [9]. The results of medical,
surgical, and deep-brain stimulation treatments of dysarthria
in Parkinson’s disease have been variable and generally
disappointing [8, 10]. Several studies have suggested that the
pathophysiology of speech disorder may be different from
limb movement disorders in Parkinson’s disease, including
studies employing functional imaging [11, 12], demon-
strating a negative correlation between disease severity and
impaired speech [13], and showing nonresponsiveness
towards levodopa in people with Parkinson’s disease-induced
oral festination [14]. However, other studies found mixed
results [15, 16]. More studies are needed to explore this area
[8].
Recent pathophysiological research studies have added
new knowledge to the original dopamine depletion theory.
Parkinson’s disease is now seen as a complex neurodegenera-
tive disease. H. Braak and E. Braak [17] suggested a sequence
of pathophysiological progression of Parkinson’s disease that
affects first the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve and
the olfactory bulbs and nucleus, then the locus coeruleus,
and later on the substantia nigra pars compacta. The cortical
area is affected at a later stage. Accordingly, damage to the
basal ganglia, a collection of multiple neuronal systems,
can result in multifaceted pathophysiological changes that
cause impairments not just to motor system but also to the
cognitive and neuropsychological systems [18].
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in
nonmotor aspects of Parkinson’s disease. Recent studies have
identified deficits in cognitive function [19–23], neuropsy-
chiatric status [24], and language [25–27]. There has been a
parallel development in the domain of speech, as researchers
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have turned from a focus purely on speech production
deficits to an interest in possible deficits of speech perception
in this population.
For some time, there have been anecdotal reports of a
distorted perception of one’s own loudness in individuals
with Parkinson’s disease [28]. This is manifest as an overes-
timation by speakers with Parkinson’s disease of their own
loudness (usually in the presence of reduced loudness of their
speech) and/or a perception by individuals with Parkinson’s
disease that they are shouting or producing abnormally
loud speech, when asked to produced speech of “normal”
loudness, as judged by the speech-language pathologist
or another nonimpaired communication partner. Another
common observation is the ability of individuals with
Parkinson’s disease to improve their loudness (and other
aspects of speech production) when prompted to do so, in
a clinical or laboratory setting, but with a return to reduced
loudness and poorer speech production upon leaving the
clinical setting. This phenomenon has posed some challenges
for research studies, as discussed later in this paper.
The anecdotal reports of impaired perception of one’s
own loudness in individuals with Parkinson’s disease raise
a number of questions: (a) is there empirical evidence to
support the anecdotal reports? (b) Is the deficit restricted
to perception of loudness, or does it also manifest in other
aspects of speech (such as the perception of pitch or
duration)? (c) Is the deficit restricted to the individual’s
own speech, or is there a more general deficit, affecting the
perception of others’ speech? (d) What are the possible
explanations for the deficit?
In the following sections, we review the available evi-
dence to address each of these questions. A parallel develop-
ment has been a recent research interest in a possible deficit
of the perception of emotion by individuals with Parkinson’s
disease. Although much of the research on emotion has
focused on deficits in visual perception (e.g., on recognizing
emotions such as angry or sad, based on photographs of
faces), there has also been some attention to the perception
of emotion as conveyed in speech. As the transmission of
emotion through speech is conveyed using dimensions such
as loudness, pitch, and duration, we also summarize recent
findings from this line of research in this paper.
2. Evidence for a Deficit in the Perception
of Loudness
One of the earliest studies of perception of loudness was
conducted by Fox and Ramig [28], who asked participants
with Parkinson’s disease and healthy controls to self-rate
their voice (loudness, shakiness, hoarseness, and mono-
tone), speech (slurred and mumbled), and communication
(understood by others, participation in conversation, and
initiating conversation), using visual analogue scales. In
contrast to what these researchers had observed in clinical
settings, where patients frequently denied a speech deficit or
claimed their speech was relatively unimpaired, the subjects
with Parkinson’s disease rated themselves significantly more
impaired than the healthy controls on all dimensions of
communication. Fox and Ramig [28] suggested possible
internal and external factors that may have contributed to
the discrepancy between the findings of this study and what
they observed clinically. Internally, people with Parkinson’s
disease may be impaired in their sense of effort when
they speak and may tend to deny accusations of lowered
loudness, as reported by others. Externally, individuals with
Parkinson’s disease may rate themselves more disabled in
communication because of their increasing experience of a
communication partner’s requests to repeat themselves.
However, in another study, patients with Parkinson’s
disease who did not undergo deep-brain stimulation and
patients before and after deep-brain stimulation were found
to be able to rate their increasing speech impairment across
time in high correlation with listener’s rating of intelligibility
[29].
A few more recent studies have used experimental
procedures to investigate the perception of loudness by indi-
viduals with Parkinson’s disease. Ho et al. [30] investigated
individuals with Parkinson’s disease who spoke softer than
healthy controls. The participants with PD demonstrated
inaccurate estimations of their speech loudness in two
different conditions: immediate and delayed playback. The
participants were asked to read aloud passages and engage in
conversations at three loudness levels: soft, normal, and loud.
They were then asked to estimate their own speech loudness
in two conditions: (i) immediately after each reading or
conversation task and (ii) after listening to an audio-
recorded playback. There was no significant task difference
(passage reading versus conversation) for either group, and
no significant difference between the immediate and delayed
conditions. However, in all conditions, there was a significant
difference between the Parkinson’s disease and control
groups; the patients with Parkinson’s disease overestimated
their loudness in all conditions, relative to their actual
loudness (objectively measured intensity). Ho and associates
hypothesized the existence of a “decreased motor set” in
people with Parkinson’s disease with both hypophonia and
deficient scaling in limb movements, linking motor speech
control with motor limb control. They also suggested that
the lack of awareness of their own reduced speech loudness
by the speakers with Parkinson’s disease supports the notion
of cooccurrence of dysarthria and a perceptual deficit of
speech. Ho and colleagues raised the question of whether
impaired speech production is driven by a basic perceptual
deficit or if perception is abnormal as a consequence of an
impaired generation of speech mechanism that is associated
with Parkinson’s disease.
A further study by Ho and associates [15] suggested that
individuals with Parkinson’s disease who had been diagnosed
with hypophonia were able to speak louder when their
attention was deliberately directed to an explicit cue. Ho
and associates compared 12 participants with Parkinson’s
disease and hypophonia and 12- age and gender-matched
healthy controls on regulating their own speech loudness in
reading and conversation tasks in two conditions: (1) implicit
cues (background noise and immediate auditory feedback)
and (2) explicit cues (instruction regarding volume level).
Healthy control subjects demonstrated a Lombard effect by
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raising their loudness against increasing background noise
and decreased their loudness in response to increased imme-
diate auditory feedback. The participants with Parkinson’s
disease, on the other hand, demonstrated overall softer
speech than the healthy controls were significantly less ca-
pable to increase their loudness to compete with increasing
background noise and to decrease their loudness in response
to immediate auditory feedback. In another further experi-
ment with an explicit attention-driven cue (instruction with
regard to volume) and implicit cues, the participants with
Parkinson’s disease were able to increase their loudness with
respect to increased background noise and were able to
decrease their loudness with increased immediate auditory
feedback, similar to the capacity for loudness regulation of
the healthy controls. Ho and associates suggested that people
with Parkinson’s disease were not aware of their softer voice
and produce softer voice unless explicit cues were given.
Ho and associates supported the notion that the deficiency
in scaling speech loudness was similar to the deficiency in
scaling limb movements in Parkinson’sdisease. The improve-
ment in loudness regulation by raising attentional effort
observed in this study suggests the involvement of executive
function [31].
Dromey and Adams [32] compared the performance of
adults with Parkinson’s disease with that of healthy controls
in three tasks: loudness estimation of warbled pure tones,
loudness rating of subjects’ own voices against intensity
anchors, and production of sustained phonation at a range
of predetermined loudness levels. There was no statistically
significant difference in the perception of loudness between
the subjects with Parkinson’s disease and the healthy controls
on any of the three tasks. The authors suggested that the
lack of significant difference might have been due to the
laboratory-based nature of the tasks or to the fact that
the Parkinson’s disease participants might have overcome
a loudness perception deficit by the presence of external
cues shown by the displays of the microphone amplifiers.
They called for further investigations using more naturalistic
communication paradigms.
A study by Adams et al. [33] supported the notion
of underestimation of speech loudness in individuals with
Parkinson’s disease. Participants with Parkinson’s disease
were asked to converse for 2-3 minutes in five noise con-
ditions (multitalker noise varied from 50 to 70 dB SPL).
The participants raised their vocal volume as background
noise increased. However, their intensity levels were 3-4 dB
less than the loudness increases by healthy controls under
the same background noise level, representing a significant
difference.
Two further studies have provided indirect evidence for
the perception of loudness by patients with Parkinson’s dis-
ease, by focusing on how patients respond to external cues.
Ho et al. [34] investigated the effect of interlocutor distance
on the perception and production of speech loudness by
people with Parkinson’s disease. Twelve patients and twelve
healthy controls were first asked to estimate the loudness
of a playing tape recorder that was moved away from
them at various distances (randomly from 1m to 8m).
The participants were asked to estimate the loudness of the
moving tape recorder by dialing the volume knob of another
tape player playing the same speech sample as the one that
was moving at various distances from them. They could not
see the moving tape recorder. All participants estimated that
the loudness of the tape player decreased with increasing
distance but the participants with Parkinson’s disease esti-
mated the loudness level to be significantly greater than
that estimated the control participants for the same distance
between the tape player and the listeners. The reason for
such a discrepancy was not clear. In another task, the partici-
pants were asked to carry out a conversation and produce
sequenced speech tasks (e.g., counting days of the week)
with an experimenter. The experimenter varied his distance
from the participants (1m to 8m, varied randomly) during
the two speech tasks. In both the conversation and the
sequenced speech task, the participants were audio-taped
and speech loudness was measured. All participants raised
their speech volumes in either conversation or sequenced
speech tasks interlocutor distance increased. However, the
Parkinson’s disease group produced significantly softer voice
than the healthy controls in both speech tasks. Furthermore,
the loudness increase in conversational speech was less than
the loudness increase in the sequenced speech task in the
Parkinson’s disease group. This phenomenon was explained
by the authors as patients with Parkinson’s disease had
more difficulties to estimate their speech loudness when they
focused more on the content of speech (as in conversation)
rather than focusing only on speech loudness (as in the
more predictable sequence speech). Ho et al. [34] attributed
the significant reduction in loudness to apossible sensori-
motor disintegration similar to the dampened movement
baseline in limb motor set production found in Parkinson’s
disease [35]. Parkinson’s disease patients may have a general
impairment in sensorimotor integration which is manifested
in reduced stride regulation in walking as well as in reduced
speech loudness regulation [15, 34].
Similar to these findings, Adams et al. [36] found that
ten participants with Parkinson’s disease had a significant
and parallel increase in loudness in conversation in two
conditions: (i) presence of multitalker noise and (ii) presence
of an interlocutor moving away at distances from 1m to
6m randomly. The participants with Parkinson’s disease
had significantly less increase in loudness (3-4 dB) than
the 14 healthy controls in both conditions. However, in
their third condition—a concurrent manual task of hand
squeezing an air bulb attached to a pressure transducer—
the researchers found that the participants with Parkinson’s
disease increased loudness significantly more than the con-
trols. In contrast, the controls reduced speech intensity when
concurrently manual task was carried out. The reason for
this apparent enhancing effect of a concurrent manual task
on speech loudness regulation in Parkinson’s disease was not
known.
In summary, several empirical studies have provided sup-
port for the clinical observation that people with Parkinson’s
disease lack awareness of their impaired loudness and have
difficulties in appropriately adjusting loudness. However,
other studies have failed to support this notion. Discrep-
ancies in findings are probably related to the nature of the
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tasks involved, although differences in severity between study
groups cannot be ruled out. Most studies have focused either
on the perception of external speech signals by people with
Parkinson’s disease or this group’s evaluation of their own
loudness. It is still unclear whether people with Parkinson’s
disease have a perceptual deficit of loudness relative to
their own speech only or whether the possible deficit also
affects the perception of loudness in other people’s speech
(although anecdotal evidence would suggest the former). A
few investigators have suggested possible explanations for an
impairment in the perception of loudness in individuals with
Parkinson’s disease; these will be further reviewed in a later
section.
Compared to reports of deficits in the perception of
speech loudness, there are relatively few studies of perceptual
deficit affecting other specific dimensions of speech [31]. Fox
and Ramig [28] found that patients with Parkinson’s disease
ranked loudness as one of the most impaired dimensions
of their voice, speech, and communication; there have been
no other systematic comparisons. However, several studies
have focused on the perception of prosody of speech, which
involves the perception of pitch, rate, loudness, and duration
[37–39]. Most investigations of the perception of prosody
by persons with Parkinson’s disease have been concerned
with the perception of emotional prosody. These studies are
reviewed in the section below.
3. Perception of Emotion and Prosody
The perception of emotion by persons with Parkinson’s
disease has attracted a great deal of research attention in
recent years. Several studies have now provided evidence of
deficits in the perception of emotions [40–42]. The deficits
appear to be specific to basic emotions such as anger, fear,
disgust, happiness, sadness, and surprise, rather than more
complex emotions such as jealousy or admiration [43, 44].
Other studies, however, were unable to provide support
for a perceptual deficit for emotion [45–48]. Furthermore,
while some studies have found that the deficit affecting
perception of emotion manifested itself in at least two major
sensory modalities, visual perception of facial expressions
and auditory perception of speech prosodies [40, 49], other
studies were only able to identify perceptual deficit of
emotions in just one modality, for example, in speech only
[50] or in facial expression only [51, 52]. However, a more
recent study by Paulmann and Pell [53] suggested that
participants with Parkinson’s disease were less accurate to
recognize emotions than healthy controls irrespective to
modality (voice, facial expressions, or semantic-lexical) or
combinations of the modalities.
Gray and Tickle-Degnen [54] conducted a meta-analysis
of 34 studies, incorporating 1295 participants with Parkin-
son’s disease, on emotion recognition in people with Parkin-
son’s disease. The effect size of their analysis was 0.52
(g = 0.52) suggesting a disease-specific perceptual deficit
of emotions in facial expression and voice in Parkinson’s
disease. Their analysis confirmed the presence of a deficit in
the perception of emotion in speech, especially affecting the
perception of negative emotions such as anger and disgust
(see also [49, 50, 55]. This lends support to the earlier
conclusions by Lloyd [56], Pell [38], Pell and Leonard [39],
Breitenstein et al. [37, 57], Scott et al. [58], and Yip et al. [59].
Gray and Tickle-Degnen [54] further found that the deficit
is not likely secondary to depression. Below, we summarize
a few key studies focusing on the perception of emotion in
speech.
Scott et al. [58] conducted one of the earliest studies
to investigate a possible speech prosody perceptual deficit
in people with Parkinson’s disease. Participants listened to
speech samples conveying different emotions and were asked
to select which facial emotion (from a choice of four)
best fit their perception. The participants with Parkinson’s
disease, who cognitively fit, were less accurate in match-
ing the emotionally intoned sentences with the respective
facial expressions when compared with healthy controls.
Participants were also asked to produce sentences with an
angry emotion. The participants with Parkinson’s disease
were less capable of producing sentences in an angry tone,
as judged by the researchers, using a 3-point scale, and were
less successful in marking the prosodic differences between
producing questions and statements. Scott and colleagues
suggested a possible relationship between deficits in the
perception and production of prosody in Parkinson’s disease
but did not indicate the nature of the relationship.
However, other studies found a dissociation between
production and reception of emotional prosody [46, 60]. In
the study by Benke et al. [60], participants with Parkinson’s
disease who had no cognitive impairment were able to
perceive emotion prosody (anger, sad, surprise, and cheer-
fulness) but were impaired in the production of emotional
prosody. Contrastively, participants with Parkinson’s disease
with a mild to moderate degree of cognitive impairment
(measured by neuropsychological tests that covered areas
such as memory and nonmotor visual coordination) were
found to be less able to identify emotions from prosody
when compared either to nondemented participants with
Parkinson’s disease or healthy controls. This suggests that
the cognitive level rather than production deficit may be
the determining factor of deficit in perception of emotion
prosody in Parkinson’s disease.
A replication of Scott and associates’ study found that
Parkinson’s disease patients had no difficulty in the recogni-
tion of vocal emotions but were impaired in the production
vocal emotions [46]. The authors also suggested that the
cognitive decline in Parkinson’s disease is associated with a
failure in comprehension of emotion prosody. Both studies
(Benke and associates and Caekebeke and associates) dis-
agreed with the notion of an association between production
and reception of emotion prosody suggested by Scott et al.
[58].
Lloyd [56] investigated nine Parkinson’s disease patients
who had been screened not to be demented or clinically
depressed, on three experimental tasks. The participants
with Parkinson’s disease were not significantly different
from healthy controls in phonemic discrimination tasks or
lexical stress discrimination tasks but were significantly poor-
er in identification of emotional prosodies from neutral
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sentences (plain statements). Lloyd suggested that the deficit
in perception of prosody in Parkinson’s disease cannot be
explained by phonological or lexical discrimination ability.
Pell [38] studied the discrimination and comprehen-
sion of prosodies (linguistic: declarative and interrogative;
emotional: sad, happy, and neutral) in eleven Parkinson’s
disease patients and found that the participants were sig-
nificantly poorer than healthy controls on identification of
the emotional prosodies but did similarly well as the healthy
controls when asked to discriminate if two given prosodies
were the same or different. This study confirms an impaired
perception of prosody in people with Parkinson’s disease as
suggested by Scott et al. [58]. Since the participants with
Parkinson’s disease had difficulties with perception but not
discrimination, Pell suggested that the deficit in percep-
tion of prosody in Parkinson’s disease does not occur in
early stage of auditory processing but in task requiring
higher cognitive demands, that is, involving higher cognitive
processes. However this suggestion was not supported by
a study using event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to
measure the brain activities of participants with Parkinson’s
disease when they categorized perceived emotion prosody.
Schro¨der et al. [50] used a mismatched negativity (MMN)
task, with measurements at 170–220msec and P3b, 350–
550msec, quantified by Cz and Pz electrode sites, to study
the categorization of “anger” emotions amongst two other
emotions (happy and neutral) in patients in two condi-
tions: passive and active listening. The authors explained
that, in passive listening, the ERP revealed an early stage
of auditory processing whereas, in active listening, ERP
revealed higher cognitive function in the participants. ERP
generated by emotional deviants (happy/sad) during passive
listening revealed diminished amplitudes of the mismatch-
related negativity for sad deviants. The authors suggested
that the perception deficit for emotion prosody is early in
preattentive auditory processing (when patients listened in
the passive listening condition) and not at a higher cortical
level. They concluded that dopamine deficiency in striato-
thalamo-cortical loops is the main cause of the processing
shortfall of emotive prosody found in Parkinson’s disease
(see also the review by Schro¨der et al. [61]). This study
provided a pathophysiological perspective, in contrast with
the behavioral perspective adopted in Pell’s earlier study [38].
In summary, the deficit in perception of emotion prosody
in Parkinson’s disease is associated with cognitive decline
[38, 46, 60] but not associated with phonological or lexical
discrimination [56]. However, at least according to Pell
(1996) [38], the cognitive deficit found in participants with
Parkinson’s disease who failed to perceive emotion pros-
ody was not similar to dementia. This may imply that it
is the cognitive skill that is associated with attention or
memory resource allocation required for identification of
emotions from prosodies which is impaired. Working mem-
ory and executive function are responsible for allocating
memory resources in situations which require competition
for attention resources. According to Repovsˇ and Baddeley
(2006) [62], working memory is part of cognitive process
that provides a transient storage and manipulation of the
information necessary for complex cognitive tasks such as
language comprehension and reasoning. Working memory
is composed of four functional components: a central ex-
ecutive that controls information to and from three other
components: visuospatial sketchpad, episodic buffer and
phonological loop. The phonological loop is responsible for
storage and maintenance of phonological information, the
visual-spatial sketchpad is responsible for storage and main-
tenance of visual and spatial information, and the episodic
buffer is a multidimensional centre responsible for binding
information to create integrated episodes.
Speech perception tasks involve some degree of executive
control and working memory [39, 63]. In the following
section, studies on the perception of emotion prosody in
people with Parkinson’s disease and the association of this
process with working memory and executive functions will
be discussed.
Breitenstein and associates [37] hypothesized that a
specific cognitive impairment such as compromised working
memory and executive function may impair perception of
emotion prosody. They studied 11 patients with Parkinson’s
disease who were nondemented (assessed by Mini-Mental
State Examination [64]), had normal hearing and were of
moderate disease stage (all at stage II of the Hoehn &
Yahr (HY) [65]). The authors used tasks such as listening
span to test working memory, alternate verbal fluency set-
shifting, and card sorting to test executive function of the
participants. Participants were asked to identify emotions
from semantically congruent and non-congruent sentences.
The semantically incongruent sentences were designed to
examine participants’ ability to divide attention (i.e., to
distribute attentional resources by selectively focusing on the
emotional prosodic meaning while inhibiting the irrelevant
or contradictory semantic content of the sentences). The
participants with Parkinson’s disease who scored low in com-
posite scores of workingmemory and executive function tests
were also significantly less accurate than healthy controls in
the identification of prosodic emotions from semantically
incongruent sentences with neutral stimuli. Breitenstein and
associates explained the findings by claiming that all these
cognitive processes are subserved by the same frontostriatal
circuitry in the brain. However, further explanation of this
claim appears to be needed.
This study has provided accumulating evidence that the
perception of emotion prosody found in nondemented and
nondepressed patients with Parkinson’s disease is caused
by compromised central executive function and working
memory. There is still some uncertainty regarding whether
a specific working memory deficit in Parkinson’s disease can
only be revealed by tasks which require selective attention.
Breitenstein et al. [57] modified their previous study
(1998) to further investigate the cognitive processes that
underlie the processing of verbal emotions. They explored
the association between a deficit in perception of emotion
prosody and two areas of cognition: (1) frontal executive
function; (2) acoustic processing. Twenty patients with
Parkinson’s disease without dementia (assessed by Mini-
Mental State Examination [64]) and with normal hearing
were recruited and tested on their general intellectual
functioning (tested by MMSE and Vocabulary or Picture
6 Parkinson’s Disease
Completion IQ scores), immediate memory (tested by digit
spans forward or backward), and central executive frontal
lobe functions (tested by verbal fluency task and Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test). The participants were further grouped
into mild and moderate PD, according to the absence or
presence of dopamine replacement therapy (DRT). Those
with DRT were characterized as the mild PD group and
those with DRT as the moderate PD group. Using similar
procedures to the previous study, the participants were asked
to identify emotions from semantically congruent and incon-
gruent sentences. The participants with moderate PD group
performed significantly poorer than healthy controls and the
mild PD group in identification of emotions from sentences
with both congruent and incongruent semantic meaning.
The accuracy of identification of emotion prosody in the
moderate PD group in noncongruent tasks was correlated
to their composite scores in central executive functioning.
However, there was no significant difference in accuracy
between the congruent and noncongruent tasks for the
moderate PD group. Breitenstein and associates explained
that the moderate PD group might have compensatory
strategies to focus on prosody rather than the semantics of
the sentences, leading to their similar performance accuracy.
The results were compared to those of patients with right-
hemisphere stroke, who scored lower in the noncongruent
tasks than the congruent tasks. The stroke patients appeared
to lack the compensatory strategies of the patients with
Parkinson’s disease.
Finally, there was no significant difference in accuracy of
emotion identification between participants in the mild PD
group and healthy controls. Only patients in the moderate
PD group demonstrated significantly poorer performance
than the healthy controls (as well at the mild PD partic-
ipants). The presence of dopamine administration in the
moderate PD group could not be ruled out as a possible
cofounding variable.
In the second part of this study (Breitenstein et al.
[57]), the researchers systematically manipulated two major
acoustic variables that play a major role in determining
emotion prosodies: speech rate and fundamental frequency
(F0 variability). The participants listened to sentences spoken
in German (which none of them had knowledge of) that
were stepwise manipulated in rate (such that rate increased
by 110–150% and decreased by 90–50%) and in fundamental
frequency (increasing by 110–150% and decreasing by
90–50%). The participants rated certainty of a perceived
emotion on a 5-point scale. All participants were more
accurate in identification of emotions when pitch rather
than rate was manipulated. However, the healthy controls
were significantly better than the patients with Parkinson’s
disease in identification of emotions when either pitch or rate
was manipulated. This result indicated that all participants
relied on pitch or rate to decode vocal emotions but the
Parkinson’s disease patients became less successful than the
healthy controls to comprehend emotions when the pitch
or rate was altered. The healthy controls were also found to
benefit from slower rate to decode emotions in prosodies
whereas the Parkinson’s disease patients were confused by
slower speech rate. The authors [57], in addition to working
memory and central executive function, suggested that at
least one other cognitive process, acoustic tone duration
processing-accounted for the perceptual deficit in people
with Parkinson’s disease.
Pell and Leonard [39] also offered compelling evidence
for the impact of working memory on the perception of
emotional prosodies. They studied 21 nondemented Parkin-
son’s disease patients who were at relative early stage of
the disease using discrimination, identification, and intensity
rating tasks. Pell and Leonard stated that the tasks of com-
prehension of prosody were dependent on the functioning
of working memory and executive function of participants.
In the perception of emotion prosody, the participants have
to hold auditory information in memory and simultaneously
process, generate a response, visually attend to verbal labels
or other response prompts and shift mental sets across tasks
that required different types of processing and response
to similar auditory materials. In this study standardized
neuropsychological tests that test working memory, atten-
tion, and executive function were administered. These tests
included Forward Digit span (measuring verbal working
memory span ) [66], the Trail-Making Test, the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST), and attention subtest of the
Mattis Dementia Rating Scale. Pell and Leonard explained
the necessity of using standardized neuropsychological tests
because they wished to dissociate the performance in
perception of emotion prosody of the participants from
more basic cognitive domains. The participants were asked to
discriminate emotions (same/different), identify emotions,
and rate the success of intended emotions from emotionally
intoned nonsense sentences spoken by five actors. The
participants with Parkinson’s disease recognized emotions
significantly less accurately in all three tasks when compared
with healthy controls. There was no significant difference
in a depression index between the two groups, indicating
that depression could not account for the impairment of
perception of vocal emotions found in the participants with
Parkinson’s disease. They concluded that the perception
deficit is found in patients who were nondemented. The
participants with Parkinson’s disease demonstrated signifi-
cant association between capacities to discriminate and to
identify prosody with auditory processing/working memory
capabilities (both rs = .51, Ps < .05). The results supported
the same notion suggested by Breitenstein and associates
[37, 57] that a specific compromised working memory and
executive function is more likely the cause of impaired
perception of emotion prosody.
Paulmann and Pell [53] tested the hypothesis of channel
availability in perception of emotion prosody in people
with Parkinson’s disease. The participants with Parkinson’s
disease in this study were tested to be cognitively high
functioning as they performed well on several traditional
executive function and working memory tests (e.g., Tower of
London, Trail-Making Test, and verbal fluency). The authors
conducted a series of perceptual tests with eleven patients
with Parkinson’s disease using different combination of
modalities: visual, prosody, and linguistic. Participants were
asked to perceive emotions conveyed in three conditions/
channels: unimodal (face, prosody, or lexical), bimodal
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(face + prosody, prosody + lexical, or face + lexical), and
trimodal (face + prosody + lexical). Both groups performed
better when more channels were available. However, the
Parkinson’s disease patients were significantly poorer in all
three conditions (uni-, bi-, and trimodal) compared with the
healthy controls. The authors suggested that Parkinson’s dis-
ease patients were less able to perceive emotions irrespective
to modalities (voice, facial expression, and semantics-lexical)
or any combination of these modalities. As the participants
were tested to be well functioning in their working memory
and executive function but still demonstrated a deficit in
perception of emotion prosody in all three modalities,
Paulman and Pell suggested other possible factors that may
impinge on the perception of emotion prosody in people
with Parkinson’s disease who are not demented or compro-
mised in working memory.
The literature has been nonconclusive regarding changes
in the perception of emotion prosody resulting from various
pharmacological or surgical treatments. It has been suggested
that the perception may be enhanced by dopamine level
[67] although no empirical study has been done. Also, there
was no significant difference in rating the valence (decision
of whether an emotion is positive or negative) of emotion
prosody between the patients with Parkinson’s disease who
did not undergo deep-brain stimulation and patients who
had deep-brain stimulation [68].
In summary, the perception of emotions in human
speech has been found to be impaired in Parkinson’s disease
in many studies. Combined evidence from these research
studies has suggested that neither depression nor dementia
accounts for the decreased perceptual accuracy of emotions
in speech; impaired working memory does appear to be
implicated. These studies have defined “working memory”
with relevance to the widely accepted four-component work-
ingmemorymodel proposed by Repovsˇ and Baddeley (2006)
[62]. However, interest has been mainly on testing working
memory as a whole, with emphasis on the supervisory
component executive function. The other components of
working memory, especially the phonological loop, which is
crucial to language comprehension, have not been reported
as much in studies on perception of emotion prosody in
people with Parkinson’s disease.
In the studies that associate working memory deficit
and perceptual deficit of emotion prosody in people with
Parkinson’s disease, working memory, and its component
executive function were measured by similar (e.g., Listening
Span measuring working memory andWisconsin Card Sort-
ing Test measuring executive function were both employed
in Breitenstein et al. 2001 [57] and Pell and Leonard,
2003 [39] to test central executive function) or different
neuropsychological tests (e.g., Trail making test was used by
Pell and Leonard’s study in 2003 [39], to test central executive
function) or different neuropsychological tests (e.g., Trail
making test was used in Pell and Leonard’s study in 2003
[39] but not in the study by Breitenstein and associates in
2001 [57]. Therefore, methodology variance is apparent in
these studies concluding the association between the deficit
in perception of emotion prosody in people with Parkinson’s
disease.
There were also a few studies which identified a specific
cognitive deficit in people with Parkinson’s disease but
without dementia. This specific cognitive deficit was termed
differently in various studies: “limitation in supervisory at-
tentional system” [69], “central executive dysfunction” [70–
72], or “reduced working memory capacity associated with
deficits in strategic memory” [73–76] (for review, please
see Breitenstein et al., 2001) [37]. It is unclear how these
different specific apparent cognitive deficits impinge on the
perception of emotion prosody in people with Parkinson’s
disease.
More studies are still needed to understand the exact
nature of the mechanism underlying the perceptual deficit
in decoding emotions in voice.
4. Explanations for Perceptual Speech Deficit
in Parkinson’s Disease
In the sections above, we reviewed the available evidence
for the presence of a deficit in the perception of loudness
and other speech dimensions (such as pitch and duration)
in individuals with Parkinson’s disease. In this section, we
review explanations that have been offered for such a deficit.
Fox and Ramig [28] (see also [77]) characterized the
observed deficit in the self-perception of speech loudness
as a deficit of “ calibration” as a result of a discrepancy
between sense of effort and the produced vocal loudness.
Lee Silverman Voice Therapy (LSVT) [78] focuses not
only on increasing loudness but also on “recalibration”
of patients’ ability to accurately judge their own speech
loudness. Participants who have received LSVT have been
shown not only to increase their loudness, but also to
generalize increased loudness outside of the clinical setting
and to maintain the changes over time [77]. However, there
is no direct evidence that LSVT leads to a more accurate
perception by patients of their own loudness.
A few researchers have suggested an association between
production deficits and perceptual deficits in speech [30, 34,
58]. However, dissociations between production and com-
prehension of emotion prosody have also been reported [46,
60]. Furthermore, there has been little expansion of this idea
(e.g., regarding whether the production deficit may lead to
the perception deficit or vice versa). This hypothesis appears
to be in need of further exploration.
As reported above, several studies have found people
with Parkinson’s disease are less accurate not only in the
perception of emotions conveyed by speech than healthy
controls but also in the perception of emotions conveyed
in facial expressions [40, 42, 59, 60, 79]. This suggests a
possible general deficit in the perception of emotions in
Parkinson’s disease. It is not known whether this reflects a
possible broader deficit in perception.
Accumulating evidence suggests that the deficit in per-
ception of emotions in speech in individuals with Parkinson’s
disease might be a result of general cognitive impairment.
Benke et al. [60] and Breitenstein and associates [57] found
that only patients at moderate stage of Parkinson’s disease
demonstrated such a deficit in perception [37, 46, 60]. Their
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studies implied that the perception deficit is a general cog-
nitive impairment. In addition, Caekebeke et al. [46] found
a dissociation between comprehension and production of
emotion prosody in nondemented patients with Parkinson’s
disease, implying that the weakness in perception of emotion
prosody is an indication of a higher cognitive impairment
and is independent of disease duration, degree of motor
dysfunction, and presence of dysarthria [50].
However, other studies indicated that specific cognitive
deficits such as compromised working memory, executive
function, or acoustic processing impairment may be the
primary cause of impairment of the perception of emotion
prosody in Parkinson’s disease [37–39, 57, 60]. Gray and
Tickle-Degnen [54] concluded from a meta-analysis of 34
research studies that compromised working memory is a
possible contributing factor to the perceptual deficit of
emotion prosody in Parkinson’s disease. Pastor and associates
[80] as well as Gra¨ber and associates [81] suggested a
cognitive deficit in an “internal pacing mechanism” in
Parkinson’s disease patients that prevents them from accurate
comparison of measured duration with stored reference
memory traces. Kotz et al. [82] suggested a model of
sensory predictability in auditory language comprehension.
In their model, the basal ganglia is a crucial nonmotor part
of the medial pre-supplementary-motor-area-basal-ganglia
(pre-SMA-BG) circuit to enhance language comprehension
by extracting external temporal cues (e.g. prosody) from
speech. Without forming such predictability cues, language
comprehension will be consequentially unsuccessful.
Neurophysiological studies have presented additional
evidence supporting a deficit in perception of emotional
prosodies in Parkinson’s disease. For example, the ERP study
reviewed above [50] suggested that perception deficit in
vocal emotions in Parkinson’s disease might occur during
early preattentive process (as in passive listening) rather than
higher cognitive level, a suggestion that is contrastive to
behavioral findings proposed by Lloyd [56] and Pell [38].
5. Conclusion and Directions for Future Studies
There has been a long-standing clinical recognition of an
impairment in the ability of individuals with Parkinson’s
disease to accurately perceive their own loudness. However,
until recently, there has been little empirical evidence to
support this observation. In this paper, we have reviewed
the available evidence on this issue. A few studies have
provided empirical support for a deficit in the perception of
loudness of one’s own speech [30, 34]. However, there have
also been conflicting reports, which have not been able to
show evidence to support the clinical observation [28, 32].
The discrepancy in results may be due to differences in
methodology. In particular, there appears to be a significant
difference in performance of the individuals with Parkinson’s
disease in “lab-based” tasks when compared with more
naturalistic communication situations [32].
Additional evidence to advance our understanding of
a possible deficit in the perception of speech has come
from a number of recent studies that have investigated the
perception of emotion by individuals with Parkinson’s dis-
ease. Again, several of these studies have provided empirical
evidence to support the notion of a deficit in the perception
of speech, particularly in the dimensions of speech critical for
conveying emotion [37–39, 56, 57].
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of the
paper allows us another perspective to determine the current
state of knowledge in this field. (a) Is there empirical evidence
to support the anecdotal reports? There is some evidence to
support the concept, as noted above. However, additional
research in this area would provide further support, and
careful consideration of methodological approaches may
permit resolution of some current discrepancies in findings.
(b) Is the deficit restricted to perception of loudness, or does it
also manifest in other aspects of speech (such as the perception
of pitch or duration)? Evidence from recent research in
prosody and emotion suggests that there is impairment in
the perception of other aspects of speech. There have been
few studies that have systematically compared perceptual
deficits in loudness to other speech dimensions. (c) Is the
deficit restricted to the individual’s own speech, or is there
a more general deficit, affecting the perception of others’
speech? This question has not been directly addressed and
appears critical for further investigation. (d) What are the
possible explanations for the deficit? Several theories have been
suggested, and there seems to be quite strong evidence to
support the involvement of workingmemory. Physiologically
based hypotheses to explain the perceptual deficit in speech
shown by individuals with Parkinson’s disease are limited, to
date.
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